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Assessing the severity of emerging infections is chal-
lenging because of potential biases in case ascertain-
ment. The first human case of infection with influenza 
A(H7N9) virus was identified in China in March 2013; 
since then, the virus has caused two epidemic waves 
in the country. There were 134 laboratory-confirmed 
cases detected in the first epidemic wave from January 
to September 2013. In the second epidemic wave of 
human infections with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus 
in China from October 2013 to October 2014, we esti-
mated that the risk of death among hospitalised cases 
of infection with influenza A(H7N9) virus was 48% 
(95% credibility interval: 42–54%), slightly higher than 
the corresponding risk in the first wave. Age-specific 
risks of death among hospitalised cases were also 
significantly higher in the second wave. Using data on 
symptomatic cases identified through national senti-
nel influenza-like illness surveillance, we estimated 
that the risk of death among symptomatic cases of 
infection with influenza A(H7N9) virus was 0.10% (95% 
credibility interval: 0.029–3.6%), which was simi-
lar to previous estimates for the first epidemic wave 
of human infections with influenza A(H7N9) virus in 
2013. An increase in the risk of death among hospital-
ised cases in the second wave could be real because 
of changes in the virus, because of seasonal changes 
in host susceptibility to severe infection, or because 
of variation in treatment practices between hospitals, 
while the increase could be artefactual because of 
changes in ascertainment of cases in different areas 
at different times. 
Introduction
Since the first human case of infection with novel avian 
influenza A(H7N9) virus was identified in China in 
March 2013, there have been two major epidemic waves 
of human infections to date. The first epidemic wave, in 
the spring of 2013, waned during the late spring and 
summer [1-3], while a second major epidemic wave 
occurred during the winter of 2013/14 and had waned 
by the end of the spring of 2014 while sporadic cases 
have continued to be reported (as of 9 October 2014). 
A small number of clusters of laboratory-confirmed 
cases have been identified in both epidemic waves, 
but the virus has not appeared to have the capacity for 
sustained human-to-human transmission [1].
Confirmed cases of infection with influenza A(H7N9) 
virus have generally been identified in hospitalised 
patients with pneumonia [4], however, a small num-
ber of confirmed cases was identified through rou-
tine sentinel influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance 
which indicates the possibility for a larger number of 
mild influenza A(H7N9) virus infections [5,6]. This has 
implications for determination of the clinical severity 
of influenza A(H7N9) virus infections, because the con-
firmed cases may not fully reflect the clinical spectrum 
of infections, and consequently changes in case ascer-
tainment could lead to artefactual variation in risk of 
severe outcomes.
In previous work, we demonstrated that the case 
fatality risk among confirmed cases of infection with 
the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus was very 
heterogeneous and difficult to interpret [7], and we 
characterised the severity of influenza A(H7N9) virus 
infections via the risk of fatalities among hospitalised 
cases (the ‘hospitalisation fatality risk’, HFR) and the 
risk of fatalities among symptomatic cases (the ‘symp-
tomatic case fatality risk’, CFR) [3]. In the first epidemic 
wave of influenza A(H7N9) virus infections in spring 
2013, we estimated the HFR at 36%, and the CFR at 
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0.16% to 2.8% [3]. The objective of the present study is 
to estimate the HFR and symptomatic CFR in the second 
epidemic wave, and to determine whether the severity 
of human infections with influenza A(H7N9) virus has 
changed over time.
Methods
Sources of data
All laboratory-confirmed human cases of avian influ-
enza A(H7N9) virus infection are reported to the Chinese 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) 
through a national surveillance system. Case defini-
tions, surveillance for identification of cases, and 
laboratory assays have been previously described [1]. 
Demographic, epidemiological, and basic clinical data 
were obtained from each confirmed case with standard-
ised forms. An integrated database was constructed by 
China CDC, with detailed epidemiological information 
about each confirmed case of infection with influenza 
A(H7N9) virus reported by 9 October 2014. We used 
information about age, sex, place of residence, dates 
of illness onset, hospital admission, intensive care unit 
(ICU) admission, mechanical ventilation, death, and 
recovery or discharge.
Statistical analysis
Cases were determined to be hospitalised for medi-
cal reasons (rather than solely for isolation purposes) 
based on routine clinical judgment, e.g. those present-
ing with complications such as pneumonia. A small 
number of cases presenting with mild respiratory 
symptoms did not have any complications through-
out the clinical course and were hospitalised only for 
the purpose of isolation. Among the confirmed cases 
of influenza A(H7N9) virus infection that were hos-
pitalised for medical reasons, i.e. excluding these 
mild cases, we estimated the risks of ICU admission, 
mechanical ventilation, and death. To allow for the 
uncertain outcomes of cases that remained in hospital 
on the date of analysis (9 October 2014), we used the 
method proposed by Garske et al., which inflates the 
observed fatality risk based on the time to death dis-
tribution [8]. We constructed 95% confidence intervals 
(CIs) using a bootstrap approach with 1,000 resamples.
To estimate the symptomatic CFR, we inferred the num-
ber of symptomatic cases based on the detection of 
symptomatic cases through sentinel ILI surveillance in 
urban areas [3]. We searched for urban areas where (i) 
the number of confirmed A(H7N9) virus infection cases 
registered by local ILI sentinels and other hospitals 
are both larger than one, and (ii) the number of outpa-
tient visits at local ILI sentinels and other hospitals is 
available. In the spring 2013 epidemic wave, Shanghai 
and Nanjing (Jiangsu province) met the criteria, and in 
the winter 2013/14 epidemic wave the city of Shaoxing 
(Zhejiang province) met the criteria. In these selected 
urban areas, we determined the daily number of all ILI 
cases reported and specimens tested by ILI surveillance 
in each location during the relevant period to infer the 
number of infected individuals who would have sought 
medical care at ILI sentinels (NILI). We assumed that 
healthcare seeking behaviour of individuals with ILI 
associated with influenza A(H7N9) virus infection was 
the same as healthcare seeking behaviour of individu-
als with ILI associated with 2009 pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1) virus infection in 2009/10 in the same area 
of China. We used data from a nationwide serosurvey 
and ILI surveillance of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pan-
demic in China from June 2009 to January 2010, to esti-
mate the proportion of individuals with symptomatic 
infections who sought medical care at ILI sentinels. We 
divided NILI by this proportion. We then estimated the 
symptomatic CFR in each location using the number of 
confirmed deaths as the numerator and the estimated 
Figure 1
Incidence of laboratory-confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus infection by date of hospitalisation, 
China, 1 February 2013–9 October 2014
The first wave of infections in 2013 is divided into two parts, before and after the announcement of human cases on 31 March 2013 because of 
the potential for under-ascertainment of less severe cases in the earlier period.
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number of mild cases as the denominator. We used a 
Bayesian framework to estimate the symptomatic CFR, 
and presented the estimates with 95% credibility inter-
vals (CrI) which have a similar interpretation to confi-
dence intervals [9].
We examined epidemiologic time-to-event distributions 
using kernel density methods as previously described 
[2]. All statistical analyses were performed using R 
version 3.0.1 (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 
Vienna, Austria) and Matlab (Mathworks Inc., Natick, 
Massachusetts, United States).
Results
In the first wave of influenza A(H7N9) cases in 2013, 
134 confirmed cases were identified (Figure 1), of whom 
124 required hospitalisation for medical reasons.
Among the hospitalised cases, the risk of serious out-
comes was higher among older hospitalised cases. 
Furthermore, we identified higher risks of fatalities 
among cases hospitalised before 31 March 2013, the 
date when the first confirmed human cases of influ-
enza A(H7N9) virus infection were officially announced 
in China (Figure 2).
We therefore divided the first wave into two parts: 
wave 1A for 18 cases hospitalised before 1 April 2013, 
and wave 1B for 106 cases hospitalised from 1 April to 
30 September 2013 (Figure 1).
In the first epidemic wave, the median age was 60 
years in wave 1A and 61 years in wave 1B. Among the 
cases under 60 years who required hospitalisation for 
medical reasons, the HFR in wave 1A was 51% (95% CI: 
21%–79%), significantly higher (p = 0.039) than the HFR 
of 17% (95% CI: 7.6%–30%) in wave 1B. For cases above 
60 years who required hospitalisation for medical rea-
sons, the HFR was also significantly higher (p = 0.025) 
in wave 1A (77%; 95% CI: 48%–94%) vs wave 1B (42%, 
95% CI: 31%–54%). We did not identify significant dif-
ferences between wave 1A and 1B in the risk of death 
or ventilation, or in the risk of death/ventilation/ICU 
admission (Figure 2).
In the second epidemic wave of influenza A(H7N9), 273 
of the 306 confirmed cases required hospitalisation for 
medical reasons with onset dates between 1 October 
2013 and 9 October 2014. The median age was 57 
years (range 2–88 years). Sixty-nine percent of cases 
were male. Among the hospitalised cases, allowing for 
censoring of outcomes in five (2%) patients remain in 
hospital on 9 October 2014, we estimated HFRs of 36% 
(95% CI: 28%–45%) in cases under 60 years, and 59% 
(95% CI: 51%–67%) in cases aged 60 years or above. 
These risks were significantly higher than in wave 1B 
(p = 0.019 and p = 0.025 respectively). There were no 
statistically significant differences between the age-
specific risks of death or ventilation, or death/ventila-
tion/ICU admission in wave 2 compared to either wave 
1A or wave 1B, while estimates of the risks of serious 
outcomes were generally lower across age groups in 
wave 1B compared with wave 2 (Figure 2). While the 
second epidemic wave occurred over a broader geo-
graphic area than the first wave, Zhejiang province 
was heavily affected in both epidemic waves. We 
Figure 2
Estimates and 95% credibility intervals of the risk of serious outcomes among laboratory-confirmed human cases of avian 
influenza A(H7N9) hospitalised for medical reasons, by age and wave, China, 1 February 2013–9 October 2014
Panel A: the risk of death. Panel B: the risk of death or mechanical ventilation. Panel C: the risk of death or mechanical ventilation or intensive 
care unit admission. 
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therefore examined the risk of death among the sub-
set of hospitalised cases in this province. Zhejiang 
province reported 40 cases in wave 1B and 88 cases 
in wave 2, and the risk of death among hospitalised 
cases under  60 years-old was significantly higher in 
wave 2 compared with wave 1B (risk ratio 7.1; 95% CI: 
1.3–292; p = 0.017) and not significantly different in 
hospitalised cases above 60 years-old (risk ratio 1.5; 
95% CI: 0.93–2.8; p = 0.099).
We examined the delays from onset to admission and 
identified similar patterns over calendar time, while 
the delay from onset to laboratory confirmation has 
shortened over time and in wave 2 the mean was eight 
days (Figure 3). Distributions of time from admission 
to death and from admission to discharge were similar 
over time (Figure 3).
We previously used information on three confirmed 
influenza A(H7N9) cases identified through ILI sur-
veillance in Shanghai and Nanjing to estimate the 
number of symptomatic cases in the spring 2013 epi-
demic wave [3]. Here we also use information on four 
confirmed cases identified through ILI surveillance in 
Shaoxing in the winter 2013/14 epidemic wave, in the 
period from 1 January to 21 January 2014, before the 
closure of live poultry markets on 22 January. During 
the same period in Shaoxing, nine hospitalised cases 
had onset of illness, of whom five died. Based on these 
observations, we estimated that there were 3,020 
Figure 3
Comparisons of epidemiologic distributions between waves, human cases of avian influenza A(H7N9), China, 
1 February 2013–9 October 2014
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Wave 1B: 1 April–30 September 2013
Wave 2: 1 October 2013–9 October 2014
0 10 20
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Wave 1A
Wave 1B
Wave 2
De
ns
ity
Days from illness onset to hospital admissionA
0 10 20
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
De
ns
ity
Days from illness onset to confirmationB
0 10 20 30 40
0.00
0.05
0.10
De
ns
ity
Days from hospital admission to deathC
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.00
0.05
De
ns
ity
Days from hospital admission to dischargeD
5www.eurosurveillance.org
(95% CI: 900–7,800) and 5,310 (95% CI: 880–17,300) 
cases in the first epidemic wave in 2013 in Shanghai 
and Nanjing, respectively, and 5,750 (95% CI: 1,960–
12,730) cases in Shaoxing in the second epidemic 
wave in 2013/14. These estimates correspond to symp-
tomatic CFRs of 490 and 69 in Shanghai and Nanjing 
respectively in the first wave, and 100 per 100,000 
symptomatic cases in Shaoxing in the second wave, 
with wide and overlapping credibility intervals (Table).
Discussion
The resurgence of human infections with avian influ-
enza A(H7N9) virus in a second epidemic wave in 
2013/14 demonstrates the continued public health risk 
of this novel strain [10]. Control of the virus in animals 
is complicated, because the infections in poultry are 
asymptomatic [11]. Human-to-human transmissibility 
of the virus remains limited, as evidenced by the very 
small number of potential secondary infections iden-
tified through detailed contact tracing of confirmed 
cases [1,2,12-14].
We identified differences in the severity of illness of 
hospitalised cases in the earlier part of the first epi-
demic wave in 2013, with greater risk of mechanical 
ventilation, ICU admission and death among cases 
hospitalised before 31 March 2013 when the first con-
firmed human cases of influenza A(H7N9) were offi-
cially announced (Figure 2) [15]. One explanation for 
this is more timely antiviral treatment and more appro-
priate supportive care for cases hospitalised after 31 
March 2013. Another possible explanation is detection 
bias in the early phase of the spring 2013 epidemic 
wave, where more severe cases were prioritised for 
repeated laboratory testing, and cases with prolonged 
virus shedding or higher virus shedding had a greater 
chance of confirmation.
In the second epidemic wave in 2013/14, we identified 
a significantly greater HFR compared with the latter 
part of the first epidemic wave in 2013 (Figure 2) and 
in persons under  60 years of age in Zhejiang province 
where cases occurred in both epidemic waves, but no 
difference in the symptomatic CFR (Table). It is possible 
that this significant difference in HFRs is due to ascer-
tainment bias in cases in different locations at different 
times, even within the same province. Alternatively, the 
HFR could have increased, because hospitalised cases 
in the second epidemic wave in 2013/14 were less 
likely to be transferred to larger referral hospitals (Dr 
Enfu Chen, Chief Epidemiologist in Zhejiang Provincial 
CDC, personal communication, June 2014), because of 
changes in the virus, or because of seasonal changes 
in the prevalence of other pathogens that could cause 
secondary or co-infections and modify the severity 
of influenza A(H7N9) virus infections [16]. Whereas 
ascertainment of infections in hospitalised cases may 
have changed over time due to changes in awareness 
and testing capacity, the ascertainment of influenza 
A(H7N9) cases through the established sentinel ILI net-
work should have remained more stable over time.
Large population-based serological studies in affected 
areas would permit assessment of severity with a 
denominator of infections, rather than cases of symp-
tomatic disease or hospitalisation, and infection-based 
severity measures could be less susceptible to biases 
due to differential healthcare seeking behaviours or 
diagnostic capacity [3,7]. To date, few serological stud-
ies have been reported and such analyses are not yet 
possible [17-19].
Our estimates of the risks of serious outcomes in 
hospitalised cases are limited by the potential for 
under-ascertainment of cases, due to lack of access 
to laboratory testing in some areas, and the potential 
for imperfect sensitivity of laboratory testing for the 
A(H7N9) virus [20,21]. While we accounted for unknown 
final status of cases that remain hospitalised in our 
analysis, the eventual estimates may change slightly 
once all outcomes are known. It is challenging to esti-
mate the symptomatic CFR based on a small number 
of confirmed cases with milder disease identified 
through sentinel ILI surveillance, and our estimates are 
dependent on the assumptions that coverage of the 
sentinel system was similar in 2013/14 compared with 
2009, and that healthcare seeking behaviours for ILI 
were similar whether illness was caused by influenza 
Table 
Estimates of the symptomatic case fatality risk, human cases of influenza A(H7N9) virus infection, China, 
1 January 2013–21 January 2014
Period analysed Geographic location
Number of 
confirmed 
deaths caused by 
influenza A(H7N9) 
virus infection
Estimated number of 
symptomatic A(H7N9) virus 
infections
Estimated risk of fatalities per 
100,000 symptomatic cases
1 Jan 2013–28 May 2013 Shanghai 14 3,020 (95% CI: 900–7,800) 490 (95% CI: 170–1,800)
1 Jan 2013–28 May 2013 Nanjing (Jiangsu province) 3 5,310 (95% CI: 880–17,300) 69 (95% CI: 12–710)
1 Jan 2014–21 Jan 2014 Shaoxing (Zhejiang province) 5 5,750 (95% CI: 1,960–12,730) 100 (95% CI: 29–360)
CI: confidence interval.
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A(H7N9) virus or the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 
virus [3]. In addition, the estimation of sCFR were based 
on data from geographic locations in which influenza 
A(H7N9) virus infections were identified through senti-
nel ILI surveillance, and a more comprehensive analy-
sis could also incorporate data on ILI surveillance in 
other areas.
In conclusion, it remains important to assess the sever-
ity of human infections with influenza A(H7N9) virus, 
as part of ongoing risk assessment of this virus. While 
the overall picture is that the severity of human infec-
tions has not substantially changed (Table), we found 
some evidence that the HFR was higher in the second 
epidemic wave in 2013/14 (Figure 2). Our results again 
highlight that many influenza A(H7N9) virus infections 
can cause mild disease [3,5,6] and that the risk of 
death among laboratory-confirmed cases is a mislead-
ing measure of severity. If another epidemic of human 
infections with influenza A(H7N9) virus occurs in the 
winter of 2014/15, proactive control measures on the 
poultry-human interface may be preferable to reactive 
measures [10,22-24]. Comprehensive surveillance of 
avian influenza virus infections in animals and humans 
is essential in order to monitor risk and guide the use 
of control measures. 
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